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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 16-3047 
 ___________ 
 
MAWUYRAYRASSUNA EMMANUEL NOVIHO, 
                                                                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LANCASTER COUNTY OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
SCOTT F. MARTIN; TODD E. BROWN; CHRISTOPHER DISSINGER  
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 5:15-cv-03151) 
 District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2017 
 
 Before:  MCKEE, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 20, 2017) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION* 
 _________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff Mawuyrayrassuna Noviho seeks review of an order dismissing his civil-
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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rights complaint.  We will affirm.  
I. 
In November 2012, a Volkswagen Passat driven by non-party Katie West 
slammed into the rear of a northbound Freightliner truck in Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania.  The Freightliner had just reentered Pennsylvania State Route 222 from the 
shoulder, and was traveling well under the posted speed limit.  West and her young 
daughter survived the collision; tragically, her husband and son did not.   
After a seven-month investigation into the crash, officials obtained a warrant for 
the arrest of the driver of the Freightliner: 22-year-old Noviho, an immigrant from Togo 
and resident of Newport News, Virginia.  Noviho faced three third-degree Pennsylvania 
felony charges—two of homicide by vehicle and one of aggravated assault by vehicle1—
and four traffic violations, which in Pennsylvania are graded as summary offenses below 
the misdemeanor level and are punishable with minor fines.2   
Noviho’s trial was held in early 2015.  The felonies were tried to a jury; Noviho 
was acquitted on all three.  Following the jury verdict and a brief recess, the Common 
Pleas trial judge held a summary bench proceeding in which he found Noviho guilty of 
three of the traffic violations: driving too slowly for conditions, failing to use his hazard 
                                                 
1 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3732(a), 3732.1(a).  
2 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 106(c) (describing summary offenses), 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6502 (establishing that Title 75 Vehicle Code violations are summary offenses carrying 
$25 fines unless specified otherwise).  Five traffic offenses were charged originally, but 
one was withdrawn by the Commonwealth.  
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lamps while stopped or while unable to maintain appropriate speed, and moving his 
vehicle unsafely.3  Noviho was fined the statutory maximum of $75, plus costs.  He 
challenged his traffic convictions on appeal without success.4 
While those appeals were pending, Noviho filed this federal civil-rights lawsuit.  
He raised 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims of false imprisonment/arrest, 
malicious prosecution, and conspiracy, and lodged a derivative Monell claim against 
Lancaster County.   
In his complaint, Noviho cast the investigation, arrest, and prosecution as an 
attempt to deflect culpability from West, who allegedly was driving under the influence 
of drugs and far in excess of the posted speed limit at the time of the crash.  Noviho 
claimed that West’s brother, defendant Scott Martin—then Lancaster County 
Commissioner, now a Pennsylvania State Senator—used his political connections to shift 
the focus of the investigation away from his sister and towards Noviho, a politically 
powerless outsider and easy scapegoat for the accident.  According to Noviho, Martin did 
so not only to protect his sister, but also to ensure the continued value of a civil action the 
family planned to file.5  Allegedly aiding Martin in this plan were defendants Christopher 
                                                 
3 See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3333, 3364(a), 4305(a), (b)(1).  Noviho was acquitted of 
driving after dark without headlights.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4302(a)(1). 
4 See Commonwealth v. Noviho, No. 394 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 889776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 17, 2016) (unpublished disposition reprinting trial court’s Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a) 
opinion), appeal denied, No. 374 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5814739 (Pa. Oct. 5, 2016).  
5 We assume that Noviho refers to West v. C.R. England, Inc., E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:14-cv-
04872, which was filed in July 2014 (about a year after the crash, but before Noviho’s 
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Dissinger, the lead detective on the crash investigation, and Todd Brown, the Lancaster 
County Assistant District Attorney who supervised and directed the investigation.     
The District Court granted the defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss Noviho’s complaint.  With regard to the false imprisonment/arrest claims, the 
Court reasoned that Noviho’s convictions on the summary traffic offenses indicated 
sufficient probable cause to justify an arrest, regardless of whether the summary offenses 
were “arrestable” under Pennsylvania law.  With regard to the malicious prosecution 
claims, the Court relied on our en banc decision in Kossler v. Crisanti6 to find that 
Noviho’s conviction on the summary offenses precluded the required “favorable 
termination” of his underlying state-court proceedings.  Finally, the Court dismissed the 
remaining conspiracy and Monell claims due to the failure of the underlying substantive 
claims.  Noviho appealed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
trial) and settled in late 2016.  The parties do not suggest that this parallel lawsuit had any 
preclusionary effect on the one now at bar, so we note it only for the sake of 
thoroughness.  
6 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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II.7 
a) Malicious Prosecution 
Turning first to the malicious prosecution claims, we agree with the District Court 
that Kossler is dispositive.  A plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must show that the 
underlying criminal proceeding ended in a “favorable termination.”8  In Kossler, we held 
that a mixed verdict, such as an “acquittal [] accompanied by a contemporaneous 
conviction at the same proceeding,” can be a favorable termination “[w]hen the 
circumstances—both the offenses as stated in the statute and the underlying facts of the 
case—indicate that the judgment as a whole . . . reflect[s] the plaintiff’s innocence.”9  
Pennsylvania defines aggravated assault by vehicle and homicide by vehicle, the felonies 
charged here, as a death or serious bodily injury resulting from a recklessness or gross 
negligence “while [a person is] engaged in the violation of any law of this 
Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to 
                                                 
7 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct plenary review, accepting as 
true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
Noviho’s favor.  See Lora-Pena v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 529 F.3d 503, 505 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  While the complaint itself remains the primary focus on review 
of a 12(b)(6) order of dismissal, we may also consider attachments to the complaint, 
matters of public record, and certain indisputably authentic documents provided in 
support of a motion to dismiss.  See Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango 
Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 127 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1993) (treating certain documents submitted in opposition to motion to dismiss as “part 
of the pleadings”).   
8 See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 186.  
9 Id. at 188.  
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the regulation of traffic.”10  In other words, the felony charges were premised on, and 
indeed required, an underlying violation of Pennsylvania’s vehicle or traffic laws.11  In 
the context of the “entire criminal proceeding,”12 the core unlawful conduct was 
Noviho’s noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code; the felony charges added 
mens rea, harm, and causality elements.  Thus, while the jury acquitted Noviho of the 
felonies, his conviction on the underlying traffic offenses means that he cannot be 
considered innocent for the purposes of favorable termination.   
As he did before the District Court, Noviho presses a novel argument in an attempt 
to distinguish Kossler: as favorable termination requires that the “proceeding” end in his 
favor, he contends that the felonies and summary offenses were adjudicated in two 
separate proceedings, because the trial judge alone sat on the latter while the jury decided 
the former.  Noviho freely admits that he can find no case law in favor of this argument, 
but notes that no case law forecloses it either.   
However, as the District Court observed, Pennsylvania law does not support this 
bifurcation of its court “proceedings”; in fact, it does the opposite.  Pennsylvania’s Rules 
of Criminal Procedure distinguish between “summary cases,” where the only offenses 
charged are summary offenses, and “court cases,” in which at least one of the offenses 
                                                 
10 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3732(a), 3732.1(a).  
11 See Bell v. Commonwealth, 96 A.3d 1005, 1017–18 (Pa. 2014) (“[H]omicide by 
vehicle requir[es] a non-DUI Vehicle Code conviction . . . .”).  
12 Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188.  
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charged is a misdemeanor or greater.13  The commentary to Pa. R. Crim. P. 400 clarifies 
that “any summary offenses” connected to a misdemeanor offense or greater “must be 
charged in the same complaint as the higher offenses and must be disposed of as part of 
the court case.”14  As required by the relevant Rules, the summary offenses were so 
charged.  That the state trial judge withheld the summary offenses from the jury does not 
militate against viewing the case as one single “court case”—a single proceeding—that 
was disposed of in part by two different fact finders.15   
In sum, under Kossler, the District Court correctly dismissed Noviho’s malicious 
prosecution claims. 
b) False Imprisonment/Arrest 
Fourth Amendment false imprisonment and false arrest claims rise and fall on 
whether probable cause existed for the arrest.16 The District Court determined that 
probable cause existed to arrest Noviho on the summary offenses, and that the 
“arrestability” of the offenses under state law was not dispositive to a federal 
constitutional inquiry.  Because the arrest was supported at least in part by probable 
cause, the District Court reasoned that Noviho’s false imprisonment and arrest claims 
                                                 
13 See Pa. R. Crim. P. 103.  
14 Pa. R. Crim. P. 400 cmt. 1.  
15 See also Noviho, 2016 WL 889776, at *3 (collecting Pennsylvania cases in which a 
defendant was “placed in the unusual situation of having a trial before two separate and 
distinct fact finders[:] a jury on the felony charge and a trial judge on the summary 
charge”). 
16 See Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 466–67 (3d Cir. 2016).   
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failed.  Although the particular facts of this case are unusual, we ultimately agree with the 
District Court that Noviho fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
As an initial matter, Noviho critiques the District Court’s failure to examine and 
reconstitute the probable cause affidavit presented by the defendants to obtain the arrest 
warrant.17  But while referenced in the complaint, the affidavit was not attached to it and 
was not otherwise introduced over the course of motions practice; the District Court 
could not have reconstituted the document without having access to it.  Moreover, our 
cases directing the District Court to reconstitute the probable cause affidavit generally 
arise on summary judgment, not dismissal.18  In any event, the central inquiry that was 
properly addressed by the District Court is not whether the warrant was defective, but 
whether Noviho successfully pleaded a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be 
free of an unreasonable seizure conducted without probable cause.19   
It seems clear that there was probable cause to arrest on the summary offenses.  
Even construing all inferences in Noviho’s favor and assuming that the summary offenses 
were not at all relevant to the magisterial district judge’s determination of probable 
                                                 
17 See id. at 470 (“Where there are improperly omitted or included facts, we have 
previously instructed district courts to perform literal, word-by-word reconstructions of 
challenged affidavits.”).  
18 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2016); Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 
462; Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000). 
19 See Graves v. Mahoning Cty., 821 F.3d 772, 775–76 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that an 
invalid arrest warrant does not preclude a reasonable arrest).  
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cause—unlikely, given as each of the felonies required an underlying traffic violation—
Noviho does not contest that the police had reason to suspect, by the time he was 
arrested, that he was operating his truck below the posted speed limit and that he 
disengaged his hazard lamps once he merged back onto the roadway.  These facts, 
themselves pleaded in the complaint, would be sufficient to suggest a “fair probability” 
that Noviho had violated the traffic laws; probable cause does not require the officers to 
resolve all conflicting evidence.20  Further, we recently reaffirmed that “false arrest or 
imprisonment claims will necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the 
crimes charged against the arrestee.”21  Noviho’s attempt to distinguish this line of 
precedent is unavailing.  
Noviho’s argument against the presence of probable cause is that the summary 
traffic offenses are not “arrestable” under Pennsylvania law, with or without a warrant.  
Thus, he contends, the analysis should be confined to whether the felony counts were 
unsupported by probable cause.   
However, that traffic offenses are not themselves “arrestable” under Pennsylvania 
law does not materially change the analysis.  First, it is more accurate to say that the 
Pennsylvania traffic offenses alone would not have supported the arrest in this case.  In 
other circumstances, officers are authorized under state law to arrest for violations 
                                                 
20 Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467; see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) 
(emphasizing the objective nature of the probable cause determination).  
21 Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 477.  
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occurring in their presence, and arrest warrants in summary cases may issue if a 
defendant ignores or will not obey a summons.22  Second, while we have suggested that 
state law is not irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry,23 its salience is 
circumscribed.24  If an arrest is “otherwise reasonable, the fact that it is not for an 
‘arrestable’ offense [under state law] does not make it unconstitutional.”25  Such is the 
case here.  
Finally, on the facts alleged in the complaint, Noviho’s false arrest and 
imprisonment claims appear to be infirm as a matter of law.26  The dividing line between 
false arrest/imprisonment claims and malicious prosecution claims is the initiation of 
                                                 
22 See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6304 (“Authority to arrest without warrant”); Pa. R. Crim. P. 
421, 430; cf. Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999) (“A warrant is 
also required to make an arrest for a misdemeanor, unless the misdemeanor is committed 
in the presence of the police officer.”).  
23 See United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).   
24 Cf. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that state restrictions on 
arrestability for “in presence” offenses do not “alter the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections”). 
25 Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.); see also 
Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 995 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases for the 
proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not incorporate an “in the presence” 
requirement for misdemeanor arrests).  
26 Although not raised below or on appeal by the defendants, this infirmity in the 
complaint is solely a matter of law and, given the unique posture of the case, would be an 
independent reason to affirm the judgment.  As a result, we exercise our discretion to 
reach it.  See Ins. Fed. of Pa., Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 669 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam) (“[W]e can affirm the dismissal on grounds other than those relied upon by 
the district court.”). 
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legal process.27  Arrests made pursuant to a “validly issued—if not validly supported—
arrest warrant” generally occur after the institution of legal process and, thus, sound in 
malicious prosecution rather than false arrest or imprisonment.28  Here, Noviho was 
arrested pursuant to a warrant, and a Pennsylvania “court case” is initiated by “the filing 
of a complaint, followed by the issuance of a summons or arrest warrant.”29  Because 
Noviho was detained pursuant to legal process, it is likely that his false 
arrest/imprisonment § 1983 claims all actually sound in malicious prosecution, and thus 
fail under the favorable termination test discussed above.30 
c) Conspiracy/Monell 
Noviho argues that his conspiracy and Monell claims should be reinstated.  
Because we agree with the District Court that these claims are dependent on the existence 
                                                 
27 See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90 (2007).   
28 Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Smith v. Munday, 
No. 15-1092, ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 465287, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2017) (“A claim for 
false arrest alleges that a warrantless arrest lacked probable cause; a claim for malicious 
prosecution alleges that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant lacked probable cause.”); 
Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).  We came to the same 
conclusion, albeit in the context of Delaware common law, in Burt v. Ferrese, 871 F.2d 
14, 17 (3d Cir. 1989). 
29 Pa. R. Crim. P. 502 cmt (emphasis added).  We note that the Common Pleas docket in 
the appendix indicates that the complaint and arrest warrant were issued on the same day.  
30 See Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If his claim is categorized as 
being like false arrest, then his claim fails because false arrest does not permit damages 
incurred after an indictment, excluding all the damages he seeks.  But if his claim is 
treated as resembling malicious prosecution, then he would face the problem that a 
plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must be innocent of the crime charged in the 
underlying prosecution.”). 
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of an underlying substantive constitutional violation—and, per the discussion above, 
finding no such claim to be well pleaded—we will not disturb the District Court’s ruling.  
III. 
Although we decide that Noviho’s complaint fails to state a claim under our 
precedent, his allegations do not fail to give us pause.  Nevertheless, for the reasons set 
forth above, we must affirm the order of the District Court.  
